By: Money Navigator Research Team
Last Reviewed: 11/02/2026
FACT CHECKED
Quick Summary
In Tide, “biometric login” is best understood as a two-part process: your device performs the biometric match locally (Face ID/Touch ID/fingerprint), and the Tide app receives only a success/fail result from the operating system before unlocking your in-app session.
The practical implications are mostly operational:
- What happens when biometrics fail
- What changes after a device switch
How to think about permissions vs authentication when multiple people access the account.
This article is educational and not financial advice.
What Tide means by “biometric login”
Tide’s published login guidance states that the Tide app no longer uses an app-specific PIN, and that there are two ways to log in: fingerprint/face recognition (if the device supports biometrics) or the PIN of your phone or tablet.
In other words, Tide is tying app access to the device’s own security framework rather than a separate in-app PIN (as described in Why can’t I log in with my Tide app PIN anymore?).
That distinction is the foundation for understanding “device vs app”:
The device decides whether the biometric attempt matches an enrolled biometric.
The app reacts to the device’s answer (success/fail) and proceeds accordingly.
What happens on your device
iPhone/iPad: Face ID and Touch ID are device-side checks
On Apple devices, Face ID data (including the mathematical representation) is encrypted and protected in the Secure Enclave, and Apple states that Face ID data does not leave the device.
Apple also states that, within supported apps, apps are only told whether authentication succeeded and cannot access Face ID data (as explained in Face ID & Privacy).
Apple’s platform security documentation also frames biometrics as a convenience layer that does not fully replace the underlying device passcode/password, and describes template processing/storage happening within the Secure Enclave (see Biometric security).
Practical meaning: when Tide is using Face ID/Touch ID for login, the biometric match happens on the device; Tide is not receiving a “face scan” or “fingerprint”, it is receiving an OS-level “authenticated/not authenticated” outcome.
Android: templates and matching are kept in secure components
On Android, the design goal is similarly to prevent raw biometric material (or templates) being exposed outside secure components.
The Android Open Source Project’s implementation guidance for fingerprint authentication states that raw fingerprint data or derivatives must never be accessible from outside the sensor driver or the trusted execution environment (TEE), and that acquisition/enrolment/recognition must occur inside the TEE (see Fingerprint HAL).
Practical meaning: the biometric match is handled by the system and secure hardware/software boundaries. The app is not meant to handle raw biometric material.
What happens in the Tide app
From the app’s perspective, “biometric login” typically looks like:
The Tide app requests biometric authentication through the operating system.
The operating system presents a system-controlled prompt/flow.
The operating system returns a result (success/fail/cancel).
If successful, the Tide app unlocks the in-app session.
Android’s developer documentation describes biometric authentication prompts as system-provided, with the app choosing what authenticators it will accept and receiving the outcome (see Show a biometric authentication dialog).
Apple similarly describes supported apps using Face ID/Touch ID for in-app authentication while limiting what apps can access (as set out in the Apple documentation linked earlier).
The key boundary: the biometric “secret” stays with the device; the Tide app consumes a yes/no outcome and then enforces its own session rules and access controls.
Biometrics, passcodes, and why “biometric login” is not a single control
Biometrics are often discussed as though they are a single control that replaces everything else. In practice, biometric login sits alongside (and depends upon) the device’s underlying security model:
Device passcode/PIN/pattern remains a fallback and a baseline requirement in many scenarios.
Biometric login can speed up access, but does not eliminate the need for device-level security settings.
From a standards perspective, it is also common for modern authentication approaches to avoid transmitting biometric data to online service providers at all.
For example, in an EBA-published response discussing FIDO specifications, it is explicitly stated that biometrics never leave the device and are not shared with or stored by online service providers (see Response to discussion on RTS on strong customer authentication and secure communication under PSD2).
Practical meaning for Tide users: biometric login is best understood as “device-authenticated unlock”, not “biometric data shared with Tide”.
Practical implications for UK businesses using Tide
Biometrics answer “is this the authenticated device user right now?”, not “is this user allowed to do this action?”.
Permissions and approval design still matter. Where payment workflows are relevant, see how permissions and approval mechanics fit together in Tide Payment Approvals and Permissions: Sending Money Explained.
If multiple people use the Tide account, each person’s authentication method depends on their own device capabilities (and how they authenticate to that device). Role and permission design sits separately; for role boundaries, see Admin vs Team Member vs Cashier in Tide: Roles Explained.
Device security becomes operational dependency
Because Tide ties login to device-level security (biometrics or device PIN), business continuity can be affected by device loss, broken biometric sensors, OS changes, or handset replacement.
Broader small business security guidance often treats device protection (screen locks, managed access, update hygiene) as a core control theme; an accessible baseline reference is the NCSC’s Cyber Security Small Business Guide.
Data governance still matters even if biometrics are device-side
Even where the biometric match is device-side, the app session still grants access to business and personal data in the account. The ICO frames secure processing as requiring appropriate technical and organisational measures, and highlights confidentiality/integrity/availability as core outcomes (see A guide to data security).
Summary Table
| Scenario | Outcome | Practical impact |
|---|---|---|
| Biometrics enabled and working | Fast unlock into the Tide session | Less friction for routine access, but still dependent on the device’s security state |
| Biometrics fail (wet finger, poor lighting, sensor issues) | OS falls back to device PIN/passcode | Access remains possible, but login speed and reliability change |
| Device restarted or security state changes | Device may require passcode before biometrics work again | “Biometric login” can appear to stop working until the device baseline is re-established |
| Team member uses a different handset model | Different biometric capability/UX | Same Tide role can feel different because authentication is device-dependent |
| App session times out | Re-authentication required | Biometrics may be requested again, depending on session rules and device settings |
| Authentication succeeds but action is restricted | User can view the app but cannot perform certain actions | Confirms that permissions/approvals sit separately from biometric login |
Scenario Table
| Scenario-level | Process-level | Outcome-level |
|---|---|---|
| “Biometric login” is enabled | OS performs biometric match locally | App receives success/fail and unlocks (or does not unlock) the session |
| Biometrics are unavailable | OS offers device credential fallback | Access path remains, but relies on device PIN/passcode |
| Device security posture changes | OS requires higher assurance before allowing biometrics | Biometrics may be temporarily unavailable even though nothing changed in Tide |
| Multi-user access exists | Each user authenticates on their own device | Authentication assurance varies by device; permissions still enforce what each user can do |
| Sensitive in-app actions occur | Apps can request re-authentication via OS prompts | Authentication and authorisation become layered controls rather than one control |
Tide Business Bank Account
Tide is commonly positioned as an app-led business account experience, so authentication choices (biometrics/device PIN) are part of day-to-day usability. For a broader neutral overview of features and positioning, see our Tide business account review.
Frequently Asked Questions
On modern smartphones, biometric templates and matching are designed to be handled by the operating system and secure components on the device, not by individual apps.
Apple’s published Face ID information describes Face ID data as protected on-device and states that apps are only notified whether authentication succeeded and cannot access Face ID data.
The practical implication is that “using biometrics in Tide” is not the same as “sending biometrics to Tide”. The app is requesting the operating system to authenticate the device user; the app then reacts to the result.
Biometric failure is typically treated as an authentication failure for that attempt, not a permanent lock-out. Tide’s published login guidance describes a fallback to the device PIN of the phone or tablet as an alternative login route.
Operationally, this is why biometric login is best treated as a convenience layer. If the device’s baseline credential cannot be used (for example, forgotten passcode or device policy restrictions), that becomes the real access constraint.
Tide’s stated rationale is security: moving away from an app-specific PIN and relying on device biometrics or the device PIN ties access to the device’s security framework. That changes what “compromise” would mean: guessing an in-app PIN is a different scenario from breaking a device lock and device authentication model.
In practice, this means that changes to device security (passcode strength, biometric enrolment, handset replacement) can influence Tide access even when nothing has changed in the Tide account itself.
Biometric login is an authentication step (unlocking your in-app session). Payment approval and permissions are authorisation decisions that depend on account role design, approvals configuration, and what the platform allows that user to do.
A useful way to separate them is: authentication answers “who is this user right now?”, while authorisation answers “what can this user do?”. It is possible for someone to be authenticated successfully and still be blocked from an action by permissions.
At a high level, the Tide app asks iOS to authenticate using the device’s enrolled biometric. The device performs the match locally and returns an outcome to the app. Apple’s published materials describe apps being notified of success/failure without access to Face ID data.
The practical edge case is that the device’s security state can override “normal” biometric behaviour. For example, after certain device events (restart/logout/security settings changes), the device may require passcode entry before biometric unlock becomes available again.
The biometric sensor and matching process are intended to run inside secure boundaries. Android’s platform documentation for fingerprint authentication emphasises preventing raw biometric data or templates being accessible outside secure components such as the trusted execution environment.
From an operational standpoint, “Android biometrics” can vary by handset manufacturer and hardware implementation. Even with that variability, the app-level concept remains: the app relies on the system prompt and consumes the result rather than handling biometric material directly.
Biometric enrolment is device-specific: when a handset changes, the biometric set-up is effectively new because it belongs to the new device. That means “biometric login” can feel like it has been reset even though the Tide account is unchanged.
In practice, a device switch can also introduce new device security defaults (for example, stronger lock requirements) or different biometric modalities. The operational effect is usually seen as extra steps during the first few logins and changes in how quickly biometrics are available.
Biometric login is tied to the device, not the “owner”. If a team member has access, their login experience depends on their handset’s biometric capability and their own device security settings.
The more important boundary for businesses is that device authentication does not override permission boundaries. Team access and role design determine what each user can do after they unlock the app session.
Biometric matching is a device-level event, while account activity is an app/platform-level event. What is generally evidencable at the account level is what actions were performed in the account under a given logged-in session, not the biometric match itself.
In practical terms, businesses usually get more value from reviewing role assignments, approval boundaries, and transaction trails than from focusing on the biometric mechanism. Biometrics are about reducing unauthorised access to a device session, not about replacing operational governance.
A common misunderstanding is treating biometrics as “Tide security” rather than “device security used by Tide”. The biometric check happens at the operating system level; the app receives an outcome and then applies its own session rules.
Another misunderstanding is assuming biometrics replace permissions, approvals, or oversight. Biometrics can reduce the risk of casual device access, but they do not define who is permitted to add payees, send payments, or change account settings once logged in.
Biometric login in Tide is best explained as an interface between two security models: device authentication (local biometric match + device credential fallback) and account governance (roles, permissions, approvals, and audit trails).
The operating system is designed to keep biometric material inside secure components and return only an authentication outcome to the app; the app then gates access to account functionality.
Where businesses often get caught out is treating “biometric login enabled” as a complete security answer. It is only one layer. The control that tends to matter most operationally is the combination of:
- Who can authenticate on their own device
- What the platform allows them to do once inside
- How consistently those permissions and approvals are applied across all users
Sources & References
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